St. Mary's Law Journal
Volume 10

Number 3

Article 3

9-1-1979

Insurance Advertising - Much Ado about Nothing Lawyer's Forum.
Michael A. Hatchell

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael A. Hatchell, Insurance Advertising - Much Ado about Nothing Lawyer's Forum., 10 ST. MARY'S L.J.
(1979).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol10/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Hatchell: Insurance Advertising - Much Ado about Nothing Lawyer's Forum.

INSURANCE ADVERTISING-MUCH ADO ABOUT
NOTHING
MICHAEL A. HATCHELL °
The question posed as the premise for this article may convey a
false sense of immediacy or uniqueness; the truth is that the problem, if indeed it is a problem, is not new at all but is one that rears
its head on a seemingly cyclical basis in response to the varying
modes of insurance -advertising. A previous wave of premium/
verdict advertising occurred in the 1950's. This campaign, which
created more controversy in the Eastern states, saw advertisements similar to those currently in vogue.' In 1953 the plaintiffs'
bar was so outraged by the companies' exercise of free speech and
dissemination of information through such advertising that it
sought, in United States ex. rel. May v. American Machinery Co.,2
to enjoin the objectionable advertisements as contempt of court,
obstruction of justice, and jury tampering. The cause was rather
unceremoniously dumped out of court on the technical ground that
no contempt was present, with the comment that the insurance
companies' claim of constitutional privilege in the uninhibited dis-

* B.B.A., LL.B., University of Texas; Member, Ramey, Flock, Hutchins, Grainger &
Jeffus, Tyler, Texas.
1. See Hoffman v. Perrucci, 117 F. Supp. 38, 39-40 (E.D. Pa. 1953), appeal dismissed,
222 F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1955). In one advertisement a printed message underneath a guarded
jury room door states:
Casualty insurance companies have been losing an average of $11 on every $100
of earned automobile liability premiums. More accidents are partly responsible. So are
excessive jury awards, rendered by jurors who feel they can afford to be generous with
the "rich" insurance company's money. Actually, jurors who are responsible for awards
in excess of what is just and reasonable are soaking you by raising insurance rates.
Id. at 39.
A second advertisment states: "Next time you serve on a jury, remember this: When you
are overly generous with an insurance company's money, you help increase not only your own
premiums, but also the cost of every article and service you buy." Id. at 39.
A notation at the bottom right hand corner of each advertisement informs the reader
that:
Most claims for damages are legitimate and reasonable, and are amicably settled
out of court.
However, as jurors tend more and more to give excessive awards in cases that do
go to court, such valuations are regarded as establishing the "going" rate for the dayto-day out-of-court claims-all of which means increased insurance premium cost to
the public.
Id. at 39-40. Additional samples of the advertisements are noted in Hoffman. See id. at 3940.
2. 116 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Wash. 1953).
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semination of information under the first amendment "appears to
have substantial merit."' 3 Interestingly enough, the current wave
of industry advertising relative to jury verdicts and premium rates
has spawned virtually identical litigation. 4
Reference to prior judicial history on this subject is made not to
denigrate or minimize the seriousness of the issue under consideration but to suggest that the relationship of insurance advertisements
vis-A-vis jury verdicts in damage cases is one that has been around
for quite some time and one that the separate jurisprudence of
each state has comfortably accommodated into its existing rules.
For that reason it is submitted that no change in the present Texas
trial practice is indicated as a result of the latest, and probably not
the last, round of premium/verdict advertising.
THE EXISTING TEXAS ATTITUDE ABOUT JURIES AND INSURANCE

When insurance, or an insurance company, is not involved in a
suit, Texas courts have consistently eschewed the slightest intrusion of insurance at any and all stages of litigation, from voir dire
examination through jury deliberation. Thus, it is error, although
not necessarily reversible error, whenever:
(a) counsel has inquired of the jury panel about any personal
connection with the "insurance industry," 5 whether jurors carry insurance with a given company,' whether a panel member would be
influenced by the fact that the defendant is insured,' or whether any
3. Id. at 163. Additional cases were resolved similarly. See Hoffman v. Perrucci, 117 F.
Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Pa. 1953), appeal dismissed, 222 F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1955); Hendrix v.
Consolidated Van Lines, 269 P.2d 435, 442 (Kan. 1954). See generally Note, Newspaper
Advertising-An Interference With A Fair Trial By Jury?, 22 U. Prrr. L. REV. 601, 603-05
(1961).
4. See Young v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., No. B-78-62 (D. Conn., Jan. 11, 1979) (order
remanding to state court as directed in consolidation with Naylor v. Case & McGrath, Inc.,
585 F.2d 557 (2d Cir. 1978)).
5. A.J. Miller Trucking Co. v. Wood, 474 S.W.2d 763, 765-66 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1971, writ refd n.r.e.) (not only error, but reversible error); Brockett v. Tice, 445 S.W.2d 20,
22-23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, writ refd n.r.e.) (question conveyed impression defendant had insurance-reversible error); see Johnson v. Reed, 464 S.W.2d 689,
692 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, writ refd n.r.e.) (no error in trial court's decision to
prohibit questions by plaintiff about connections with the insurance industry), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 981 (1972); Tarbutton v. Ambriz, 259 S.W. 259, 260-61 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1924, writ dism'd) (connection with insurance industry could have no legitimate bearing
on the case).
6. Green v. Ligon, 190 S.W.2d 742, 746-47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945, writ refd
n.r.e.).
7. Houston Car Wheel & Mach. Co. v. Smith, 160 S.W. 435, 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1913, writ refd).
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panel members have adjusted claims;8
(b) counsel informs the jury that "no insurance" is involved in
the case;'
(c) witnesses are questioned in a manner calculated to elicit
information about insurance,' 0 or a witness, inadvertently or otherwise, responds in a manner that discloses insurance coverage;"
(d) the existence of insurance coverage is implied during jury
argument, such as by emphasizing that the jury should not worry
about who is going to pay, stating that the defendant is not being
asked to pay money by the suit, or by making references to insurance adjusters in reference to the facts of the case; 2
(e) the jury considers the possibility of insurance coverage and
speculates about defendant's
ability to recoup the judgment from
3
an insurance carrier.

Injection of insurance into a case does not always call for automatic reversal. As with any alleged error the requirement of rule
434, that the error complained of was calculated to and probably did
cause the rendition of an improper judgment, must be met before a
verdict is set aside because of the infection of the influence of insurance. 4 The point is, however, that the insurance taboo practiced in
8. Shoppers World v. Villarreal, 518 S.W.2d 913, 920-21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
9. St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Gregory, 387 S.W.2d 27, 33 (Tex. 1965). It also would be error
for the judge to inform the jury there was no insurance in the case. See Dennis v. Hulse, 362
S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. 1962) (not reversible because no showing of harm).
10. Ford v. Carpenter, 147 Tex. 447, 450-51, 216 S.W.2d 558, 559 (1949) (error and
calculated to cause harm to refer to plaintiff's insurance protection, but not reversible if
plaintiff does not ask for mistrial); Southern Pac. Trans. Co. v. Peralez, 546 S.W.2d 88, 96
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (would have been reversible error if
trial court had not refused to allow question referring to plaintiff's insurance protection); see
Rojas v. Vuocolo, 142 Tex. 152, 155, 177 S.W.2d 962, 963-64 (1944) (reversible error to allow
witness to answer question by juror concerning insurance protection).
11. Dennis v. Hulse, 362 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. 1962) (mention of insurance by witness
was improper but not necessarily reversible error); see Page v. Thomas, 123 Tex. 368, 37072, 71 S.W.2d 234, 235-36 (1934) (reversible error).
12. Springer v. Baggs, 500 S.W.2d 541, 542-43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Acosta, 435 S.W.2d 539, 549 (Tex.'Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Griffith v. Casteel, 313 S.W.2d 149, 155
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Martinez v. Williams, 312 S.W.2d 742, 750751 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, no writ).
13. Barrington v. Duncan, 140 Tex. 510, 516, 169 S.W.2d 462, 464-65 (1943); Southwestern Sheet Metal Works v. Leavell, 414 S.W.2d 723, 725-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Eichelberger v. Rankin, 278 S.W.2d 278, 279-80 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Plains Creamery v. Denny, 277 S.W.2d 755, 768 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
14. St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Gregory, 387 S.W.2d 27, 33 (Tex. 1965); Dennis v. Hulse, 362
S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. 1962); see Tax. R. Civ. P. 434.
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Texas covers the full panoply of trial activity and is deeply rooted
in the common law of the state, being virtually as old as litigation
itself.
For purposes of the present problem, it is useful to consider why
the ban against insurance is so pervasive. For well over forty years,
the highest courts have acknowledged that the tenet that "juries are
much more apt to return a verdict for the injured party, and for a
larger amount, if they know the loss is to ultimately fall on an
insurance company," is so basic to human nature that courts can
judicially know it." The philosophical basis for this recognition was
deeply engrained in Texas practice even before the general charge
went out of vogue. In 1913 the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals
explained in Houston Car Wheel & Machine Co. v. Smith'" that the
question of insurance in a case is immaterial and noted that the
injection of these facts has a tendency to influence the size of a jury's
verdict and possibly even the course of their deliberations.' 7 In
Houston the court said:
What could have been the purpose of such inquiry if notto impress
upon the mind of the jury that the defendant did carry such
insurance? And what effect could have been expected, except that it
would have some bearing upon their minds in passing upon the facts
in the case? .

Appellee's counsel knew that he would not be per-

mitted to make such a fact an issue in the case, nor in any manner
directly bring it to the attention of the jury. He will not be permitted
to do by indirection what he cannot do by direction.' 8
With the adoption of article 2189 of the Revised Civil Statutes in
1925"1 (since repealed) and later, rules 277-279 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure,'" Texas was committed to a special issue practice for
15. Kuntz v. Spence, 67 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1934, holding approved);
accord, Barrington v. Duncan, 140 Tex. 510, 516, 169 S.W.2d 462, 465 (1943). See generally
Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. Rav. 744, 754 (1959); Gay,
"Blindfolding" the Jury: Another View, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 368, 372 (1956); Vetter, Voir Dire
Il-Liability Insurance, 29 Mo. L. REv. 305, 306 (1964).
16. 160 S.W. 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1913, writ refld).
17. Id. at 437; accord, Tarbutton v. Ambriz, 259 S.W. 259, 260-61 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1924, writ dism'd); Lange v. Lawrence, 259 S.W. 261, 261-62 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1924, writ dism'd).
18. Houston Car Wheel & Mach. Co. v. Smith, 160 S.W. 435, 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1913, writ ref'd). The plaintiff's attorney asked a juror, who was employed as an
insurance agent, "would the fact that the defendant might have or carry an accident policy
in some other company indemnifying him against loss tend to influence your action, if you
were selected to serve as juryman in this case?" Id. at 437.
19. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2189 (1925), now codified in TEx. R. Civ. P. 277-279.
20. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277-279.
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obtaining jury verdicts on the underlying theory that better justice
is meted out if the jury is confined to finding facts via special issues
rather than being given rein to weigh not only facts but the competing sympathies, equities, social ramifications, and philosophical
considerations that naturally tend to invade and compromise verdicts based upon a general charge.2 ' Thus, even though contemporary jurors may be said to be more sophisticated regarding the existence of insurance in damage cases, the fact-finding role of jurors
mandated by the rules of procedure increases the necessity that this
function be isolated from extraneous and potentially influential factors of which insurance coverage is one of the most prominent.22 To
be effective in preserving the role of the jury, the barrier against the
intrusion of insurance must be erected at the initial juncture on the
road to verdict-voir dire examination. The oft-cited case of Green
v. Ligon2 3 dwells at length on this point, underscoring the disruptive
nature of insurance on the jury process and the utter necessity to
eliminate its taint at voir dire.2 4 The court noted that generally
attorneys are allowed a broad range of questions on voir dire, but
then observed that in the case before it the question was whether
this broad range of inquiry entitled counsel to ask questions that
were calculated to give the jury the impression that an insurance
company had an interest in the suit.2 5 In deciding that such questions were not permissible the count said:
It is the settled doctrine in this state. . . that in cases. . . between
two individuals where there is nothing to indicate that either carries
indemnity insurance, that litigants may not by word, act, or deed
convey to the jury the idea that some insurance company will be
called upon to pay the judgment entered; if this rule is infringed a
reversal of the judgment must follow. [Citing authority]. Likewise
it may not be approached by questioning jurors on voir dire. [Citing
authority]. . . . [Flar more harm would come from a relaxing of
the fixed rule than if strictly adhered to. We believe that if by questions on voir dire suggestions of insurance should be allowed the flood
gates would be opened that would in effect abrogate the rule prohibit26
ing the injection into a case of immaterial matters.
21. See generally Gay, "Blindfolding" the Jury: Another View, 34 TExAs L. Rav. 368,
377-81 (1956).
22. See id. at 373.
23. 190 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
24. Id. at 747-48.
25. Id. at 747.
26. Id. at 748.
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On the strength of that holding, one could conclude beyond cavil
that, to use a tired but appropriate cliche, it is "settled" that insurance is not a proper subject for voir dire examination in Texas and
that the ban is in strict conformity with Texas' jurisprudential system, rooted in a discernible attempt at achieving justice through
equal treatment of all litigants before the bar.2"
Admittedly, Texas has been among the strictest jurisdictions as
far as voir dire and the insurance ban are concerned.Y The problem
encountered most frequently has been with general questioning of
jurors concerning their interest in or association with the insurance
industry or claims adjustment. Appellate resolution of that issue
has been ambivalent, ranging from outright condemnation and reversal," to mild condemnation coupled with a finding of harmlessness,3 to tacit approval." But tacit approval is essentially as far as
Texas courts have gone; keenly personal inquiries that focus upon
a particular insurance company or a particular attitude about insurance coverage have been forbidden. 2
. As a result of this stricture in voir dire examination, Texas courts,
save on one occasion, have not been called upon to condemn or
condone questioning relating to jurors' perception of a potential
verdict's effect upon insurance premiums. In that one case, Brockett
v. Tice,"3 plaintiff's counsel "'asked whether any juror had any
connection with any insurance company,' "and though admonished
to cease this pursuit, was bold enough to further inquire if any jurors
"'thought the verdict in the case would affect their insurance
27. The ban on mention of insurance in voir dire is in accord with the general prohibition
against mention of insurance at all stages of the trial process. See, e.g., St. Louis Sw. Ry. v.
Gregory, 387 S.W.2d 27, 33 (Tex. 1965); Dennis v. Hulse, 362 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. 1962);
Barrington v. Duncan, 140 Tex. 510, 516, 169 S.W.2d 462, 464 (1943).
28. Compare Hart v. Wielt, 84 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (Ct. App. 1970) and Mathena v.
Burchett, 369 P.2d 487, 490-91 (Kan. 1962) with A.J. Miller Trucking Co. v. Wood, 474
S.W.2d 763, 766 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) and Green v. Ligon, 190
S.W.2d 742, 747-49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Annot.,
89 A.L.R.2d 1177 (1963); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 792-816 (1949).
29. A.J. Miller Trucking Co. v. Wood, 474 S.W.2d 763, 766 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971,
writ refd n.r.e.) (question infers insurance-reversible error).
30. Shoppers World v. Villarreal, 518 S.W.2d 913, 920-21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1975, writ refd n.r.e.) (error, but no showing of harm).
31. See South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933, 941-42 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (no showing of prejudice).
32. See Brockett v. Tice, 445 S.W.2d 20, 21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Green v. Ligon, 190 S.W.2d 742, 747-49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945,
writ refd n.r.e.).
33. 445 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston l1st Dist.] 1969, writ refd n.r.e.).
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rates.' "3'The judgment for plaintiff was reversed because the reference, combined with other references to insurance, was prejudicial
and affected the verdict.3 1 It is difficult to say whether the prem-

ium/verdict inquiry would have been sufficient alone to reverse the
case, but a good argument can be made to that effect since the
court's decision was premised heavily upon the intent of counsel to
inject insurance into the case and the question relative to premiums
was doubtless intentional-indeed, the court so noted. 6
In view of the standard ban against mention of insurance in voir
dire as amplified and extended by the Brockett decision, one should
assume that Texas law now precludes, on the penalty of potential
reversal, exploration of jurors' attitudes about correllation between
verdicts and insurance premiums. The ban on mention of insurance
held fast through the industry media blitz of 1950's without a great
hue and cry for reform premised upon a real or imagined deleterious
effect upon jury verdicts. This fact strongly suggests that our jury
system has already accommodated itself adequately to extraneous
influences like advertising.
The experience of other jurisdictions is not particularly helpful or
persuasive one way or the other. There are, of course, decisions in
some states adopting a more liberal stance regarding the type of voir
dire in question, but actual opinions that have broached the subject are cursory at best and state no philosophical justification for
such questioning persuasive enough to condemn the Texas approach.3 7 In Hoffman v. Perrucci,5 one of the suits that sought to
enjoin the 1950's advertising campaign, the court commented
purely as an aside in denying the injunction that "plaintiff will have
an opportunity to question the prospective jurors concerning the
possible effect such advertisements and pamphlets may have on any
award of damages which they may render.

court 0

'3

Later, a New York

intermediate appellate
set aside an order prohibiting voir
dire inquiry on this particular subject, reasoning that the dissemi34. Id. at 21.
35. Id. at 25.
36. "The necessary effect of this was to infer that appellant had insurance because a

verdict could not possibly affect their rates unless he had insurance." Id. at 22.
37. See Hoffman v. Perrucci, 117 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Pa. 1953), appeal dismissed, 222
F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1955) (no explanation of the need for question); Graham v. Waite, 257
N.Y.S.2d 629, 630 (App. Div. 1965) (memorandum opinion) (no explanation or justification
for holding).
38. 117 F. Supp. 38 (E.D, Pa. 1953), appeal dismissed, 222 F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1955).
39. Id. at 40.
40. Graham v. Waite, 257 N.Y.S.2d 629, 630 (App. Div. 1965) (memorandum opinion).
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nation by insurance companies of information concerning the impact of jury awards upon insurance rates "may be a proper subject
for exploration upon voir dire examination of the jury panel."" The
single, inconclusive sentence quoted, however, was the extent of the
court's holding. The Arkansas Supreme Court approved a voir dire
question that asked jurors if they were insured "with any mutual
benefit liability company where your premiums are determined
upon the size of judgments given in personal injury actions for the
previous year?' 4 In a later action, however, the court found the
refusal to permit such a question was also proper. 3 Other courts
have not been convinced that such examination is appropriate. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals found "unnecessary" a question asking
if jurors had "read articles, periodicals, editorials, any material,
pertaining to automobile accidents jury verdicts?"" The Connecticut Supreme Court condemned as "vague and ambiguous" a voir
dire question that asked: "Would you feel that you have any financial interest in this lawsuit, or might in any way be affected by
awarding damages to the Plaintiffs?' 5 A Maryland court approved
trial court action prohibiting plaintiff from inquiring on voir dire if
jurors had "formed any ideas with reference to amounts of jury
verdicts.'4 And, finally, a North Carolina court held that it was a
prejudicial injection of insurance to ask: "Is there any member of
the jury who feels that his liability insurance rates will go up if he
' 7
returns a verdict against the defendants in this case?" '
These meager and inconclusive pronouncements on the subject
are insignificant. It is important that there is a veritible paucity
of authority on the subject from the collective states. This lack of
authority raises a clamor of silence supporting the notion that the
effect of premium/verdict advertising generally has not been perceived as a factor which vitally affects the qualifications of jurors
or the quality of verdicts. Indeed, one court was regaled with advertisements regarding verdicts and jurors' financial interests spanning
twenty years, yet remained unmoved toward a blanket approval of
41.
42.
43.
44.
S.W.2d
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
Dedmon v. Thalheimer, 290 S.W.2d 16, 16-17 (Ark. 1956).
Malone v. Riley, 321 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Ark. 1959).
Farmer v. Pearl, 415 S.W.2d 358, 361 (Ky. 1967). See also Farrow v. Cundiff, 383
119, 120 (Ky. 1964).
Lowell v. Daly, 169 A.2d 888, 889 (Conn. 1961).
Kujawa v. Baltimore Transit Co., 167 A.2d 96, 98 (Md. 1961).
Maness v. Bullins, 198 S.E.2d 752, 752-53 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973).
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voir dire on the subject." What then, is so pervasive about the
current, and doubtless short lived, insurance company media campaign that requires undoing the settled axioms discussed above and
renders it so disruptive that reform of the present voir dire rules and
regulations is required?
REASONS FOR RESTRICTING PREMIUM/VERDICT INQUIRIES FROM

Voir Dire

EXAMINATION

It is difficult to see how the current industry campaign provides
sufficient impetus for expanding voir dire examination into the
premium/verdict arena when prior campaigns have not convinced
courts to do so. Better reasoning still supports the total ban against
referring to insurance on voir dire when considered in the light of
present jury practice philosophy and procedural safeguards attendant thereto, potential harm to both plaintiffs and defendants from
permitting such inquiry to invade a given case, and the nature of
the advertising employed.
Necessity for Preservationof Jurors' Fact-FindingStatus
The most conspicuous reason for continuing the ban against all
types of insurance-related voir dire examination, including premium/verdict inquiries, is the numerous sacrifices that would have
to be made to the "blindfolded," fact-finding jury concept that
has always been considered a feather in the cap of Texas jurisprudence.49 The first compromise would be to sacrifice Texas' traditional
issue-oriented and qualification-related voir dire examination in
favor of a "rabbit trail" type of examination more appropriate to a
psychoanalyst's couch or to the diary of a private investigator than
to the decorum of a courtroom. The author has seen no convincing
evidence that potential jurors have been so radically politicized by
insurance company advertising that the judically conceded relationship between a juror's knowledge of insurance coverage and the
frequency or excess of plaintiffs' verdicts no longer prevails. Indeed, one could hardly deny that the increase in the size of verdicts
subsequent to the 1950 industry advertising campaign has been
healthy if not astonishing.'
48. See Murell v. Spillman, 442 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Ky. 1969) (remains in discretion of
trial judge).
49. See generally Gay, "Blindfolding" the Jury: Another View, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 368,
368-77 (1956).
50. The size of verdicts has greatly increased. In 1976 the increase in verdict size for four
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Regardless of its professed purpose, premium/verdict voir dire
examination inherently tends to inform the jury that insurance is
involved. As the court noted of just such an inquiry in Brockett v.
Tice,5 the question necessarily implies that the defendant has insurance because if he does not, a verdict against him could not
possibly affect the jurors' rates.2 This suggestion of insurance, in
addition to its prejudice, is generally confusing because of its implication that insurance is an integral issue in the case. It is misleading
in cases when no insurance exists, as was
noted of a comparable
53
injection of insurance in Green v. Ligon.

There can be no doubt that the question propounded by counsel to
the jury before being impaneled did impart sufficient information to
lead at least some of the jurors to believe that the defendant in this
case was protected by a policy of insurance. It makes little difference
as to the good faith of counsel in asking the question for the purpose
of obtaining needed information-the result and effect of the question
were the same as if he had made the inquiry for the deliberate purpose of accomplishing the end that it obviously brought. The plaintiff's rights ended where the defendant's began."
The prevalence of insurance company advertising does not make the
existence of insurance coverage or a given insurance company any
more a part or a party to a lawsuit. If the rules governing voir dire
examination are relaxed to permit exploration of the premium/
verdict issue, the relaxation gives credence to an issue that has no
real bearing on the case.55
Additionally, allowing examination on this issue raises the problem when to draw the line on other collateral issues. For example,
any fair response to premium/verdict interrogation by a plaintiff
should allow defense counsel, among other things, to explore jurors'
inherent sympathies for injured parties, widows, and children; their
general economic philosophy; their attitude toward "target defendants" such as corporations; their assumptions concerning the exselected injuries was 16.6%, a rather significant increase. Jury Verdict Research, Inc., Current
Award Trends, 1 PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS 1, 2-3 (1978). In two areas, product

liability and medical malpractice, there has been a consistent increase in plaintiff verdicts
from 1971 through 1976. Id. at 9.
51. 445 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, writ refd n.r.e.).
52. Id. at 22.
53. 190 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945, writ refd n.r.e.).
54. Id. at 748.
55. See, e.g., St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Gregory, 387 S.W.2d 27, 33 (Tex. 1965); Dennis v.
Hulse, 362 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. 1962); Barrington v. Duncan, 140 Tex. 510, 516,169 S.W.2d
462, 464 (1943).
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istence of insurance vel non in the case; and their attitudes about
insurance companies, claims, and insurance fraud. Even more pertinent inquiry could explore the jurors' relationship to, or association
with, anyone active in the organized plaintiffs' bar or their attendance at speeches or seminars featuring plaintiffs' attorneys who
regale insurance companies for their practices or promote the expansion of theories of recovery. Jurors could be asked about their
participation in labor union instructional seminars seeking to inform participants how to achieve plaintiffs' verdicts in answering
special issues, informing them of the presence of insurance in personal injury cases, and urging healthy economic awards as a beneficial end. In fact, any employment or association by jurors with
lobbying efforts of the plaintiffs' bar to expand theories of liability
or to alter modes of practice would be subject to inquiry. Such a
broad range of inquiry would take the voir dire on and on into untold
numbers of ethereal issues far removed from the concrete conflict
between the litigating parties. Indeed, once the "flood gates" referred to in Green v. Ligon" are widened for such collateral matters,
one can envision civil voir dire assuming the status currently in
vogue in criminal practice in which jurors' personal lives, opinions,
and attitudes are interminably sifted in individual examination
while hired psychologists compile psychological profiles on each
juror.
Insurance company advertising is hardly a sufficient reason per
se to compromise present practice in such a radical fashion. Its use
as a premise for expanding voir dire examination pales virtually to
insignificance when stock is taken of the safeguards already built
into the system to protect jury deliberation from extraneous influence. There are, first of all, the specific written instructions given
jurors prior to every case admonishing them to "consider only the
evidence introduced here under oath."57 More specifically, a juror's
propensity to be influenced by personal monetary considerations
should be controlled by the charge "not [to] let bias, prejudice or
sympathy play any part in your deliberations," ' and the particular
effect of all matters related to insurance would be negated by the
written instruction not to "consider, discuss, nor speculate whether
or not any party is or is not protected in whole or in part by insurance of any kind."59
56.
57.
58.
59.

190 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945, writ refd n.r.e.).
TEx. R. Civ. P. 226a ( III, Written Instruction 2).
Id. ( III, Written Instruction 1).
Id. ( II, Written Instruction 9).
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Second, essentially the same exploration can be indulged by using
questions, proper under the present practice, which do not inject
insurance into the case. The Kentucky Court of Appeals correctly
0 that the ultimate thrust of questions
noted in Farmer v. Pearl"
probing a juror's acquaintance with literature correlating verdict
size and liability premiums is simply to ascertain if a juror can
render an impartial verdict." If insurance company advertising is
truly perceived to be a negative influence, its influence can be ascertained by asking either of two questions:
(1) Does any member of the panel have any opinion or belief
about the facts of this case, or about cases of this nature in general,
which would indicate that you could not impartially consider plaintiff's evidence and contentions?; or more pointedly,
(2) Does any member of the panel know of any reason why he
or she could not consider the total amount of damages sued for if
supported by the evidence?
Should any juror respond to these questions by raising his hand, an
in camera examination by the court could be conducted, and if the
.opinion disqualified the juror, he could be challenged for cause. If
the juror did not disqualify himself, plaintiff's counsel would still
have information needed to exercise an intelligent peremptory challenge.
Of course this suggestion is founded upon the assumption that
jurors would be able to discern those influences that might affect
their verdict and answer accordingly-such an assumption may or
may not be correct. Premium/verdict voir dire examination is based
upon the same premise, however, and if the premise is false, it
would be fruitless to pursue that type of examination anyway. More
dangerously, premium/verdict voir dire examination would permit
the voir dire inquiry to act as a subterfuge for injection of insurance
into the case. Indeed, Mr. Kronzer's excoriation of present trial
practice for permitting the jury to flounder in speculation and his
advocacy of revealing that an insurance company is often the real
party in interest strips away the veneer of concern for the integrity
60. 415 S.W.2d 358 (Ky. 1967).
61. Id. at 361.
Let's suppose for a moment that the court had permitted counsel to pursue this inquiry
and one or several of the jurors had replied in the affirmative. The next question would
obviously be whether or not the exposure to such reading material would prevent the
jurors from reaching a fair and impartial verdict, and this is the very question which
both the court and counsel had previously propounded.

Id. at 361.
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of the jury system and bares the self-serving desire to infect tort
litigation with the taint of insurance, knowing full well the
judicially-conceded fact that such considerations invariably prejudice defendants, both regarding liability and damages.2
PotentialHarm to Plaintiffs
Despite the urging for the type of attitude-exploring voir dire
examination under scrutiny here, it is doubtful whether its indulgence would be in the best interest of plaintiffs. First of all, it is
questionable whether inquiries about premium/verdict advertising
would be productive. Quizzing jurors on this subject is, in a sense,
challenging their integrity to render an unbiased and impartial verdict. People are generally reluctant to admit openly, particularly in
a crowded courtroom, that their prior experiences or attitudes could
cause them to be unfair to one party or the other. Thus, voir dire
concerning their attitudes about verdicts and insurance premiums
runs the risk of being unproductive not only among those jurors who
have not been touched by the advertising or who have no opinion
about verdicts and premium rates, but also with those too embarrassed to respond to the question. Second, in broaching the subject
with the panel, plaintiff's counsel invites the risk by his questions
of implanting in jurors' minds the very attitude he seeks to ferret
out. Once aroused, this curiosity about the effect of a verdict upon
premiums could smolder in the mind of a juror previously naive
of the subject, catching fire in jury deliberations. This potentially
counter-productive effect underscores the wisdom of insulating
voir dire examination from all such collateral issues.
The Nature and Effect of Company Advertising
If leaflets or pamphlets urging low verdicts as a hedge against
high liability insurance rates were being distributed by insurance
industry representatives to potential jurors at the courthouse steps
on jury summons day, there would be ample justification for taking
action against this type of influence, as it would be a specific influence pointed at the jury service and verdict in a given case. The
remedy, however, would probably be a mistrial rather than expanded voir dire examination. Nothing of this kind is alleged to be
taking place in the current industry advertising campaign. The advertisements that the author has seen, or heard, appear in nation62. See authorities cited note 15 supra.
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wide or regional magazines and newspapers or are broadcast over
the radio. Examples, which are included in the appendices, 3 are
similar to those that were prevalant in the 1950's.11 On their fdce,
these advertisements are merely rhetorical dramatizations of problems facing the insurance industry. They are manifestly one-sided
in nature, and the general public, having grown accustomed to grandiose exhortation in the media, can be expected to place these
dramatizations in context and discount them according to their
partisan source. Indeed, the premise of the ads, that there is a
relation between higher verdicts and higher premiums, is a simple
one which the average juror probably understands anyway.6 5
If encountered by a potential juror in an extrajudicial setting, the
advertisements merely count as one of life's experiences which competes with other general experiences that converge to form a juror's
attitude and reaction to sociolegal situations and issues. In Houston
Car Wheel & Machine Co. v. Smith" the San Antonio Court of Civil
Appeals correctly noted that "jurors, unfortunately, cannot be
stripped of the frailties of human nature when they enter the jury
box, and they carry into their deliberations as jurors prejudices and
prepossessions of which they themselves are often unaware." 7 Voir
dire examination will never be able to pinpoint all the attitudeforming influences jurors bring to the courthouse. The lengths to
which one would have to go to explore the most conspicuous of these
influences is not compatible with the efficient progress of litigagation, is out of character with the decorum of the civil courtroom,
and is an affront to the privacy that jurors might legitimately
expect in terms of the issues in a civil case. Nothing in industry
advertising practices justifies venturing so far afield via voir dire
examination.
CONCLUSION

If it is truly a social evil, a public fraud or misrepresentation, or
a threat to rule by law for insurance companies to publicly proclaim
a cause and effect relationship between liability insurance rates and
jury verdicts, adequate control and safeguards for that problem can
63. See apendices A and B.
64. See note 1 supra.
65. As stated in Bunch v. Crader, 369 S.W.2d 768, 770-71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963), "It is
also a fact, which is at least subject to argument, that the average insured juror realizes that
claims against liability carriers furnish the premium basis, and that the greater the losses
the higher the premiums."
66. 160 S.W. 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1913, writ ref'd).
67. Id. at 437.
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441

be found in article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code. " The appeal
to expand voir dire examination in response to this advertising,
however, is essentially a non-issue. It is a matter that the courts
have faced before and for which allowance has been made through
the rules of procedure and currently permissible voir dire examination. It is always unwise, and would be unwise in this case, to attempt a radical overhaul of existing, adequate trial procedures, risking the injection of far more prejudicial matters than are sought to
be eliminated, as a pure overreaction to a temporary social phenomenon.
68. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1963-1978). To the extent that
premium/verdict advertising could be deemed "untrue, deceptive or misleading" it would be
an "unfair or deceptive act or practice" within the meaning of section 4(2) of article 21.21 of
the Insurance Code, and subject to both fine and prohibition pursuant to sections 7 and 10
of article 21.21. See id. §§ 3, 4(2), 7, 10.
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[oo bad judges can't
read this to a jury.
Atruck without brake lights is hit from behind. For "psychic

damages" to the driver, because his pride was hurt when

his wife had to work, a jury awards $480,000 above and
beyond his medical bills and wage losses.

A67-year old factory worker loses an arm on the job.
His lawyer argues that he should receive wages for all the
APPENDIX A
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remaining years of his life expectancy. He had been earning
about $10,000 a year. The jury awards him a sum equal to
almostThen
$89,000
a year.'
there's
the one ...but you can probably provide
the next example. Most of us know hair-raising stories of
windfall awards won in court. Justified claims should be
compensated, of course. lEtna 's point is that it is time to
look hard at what windfall awards are costing.
What can we do? Several things:
We can stop assessing "liability" where there really
was no fault -and express our sympathy for victims
through other means.
We can ask juries to take into account a victim's own
responsibility for his losses. And we can urge that awards

realistically reflect the actual loss suffered-that they be a
fair compensation,but not a reward.
S

4

Insurers, lawyers, judges- each of us shares some

blame for this mess. But it is you, the public, who can best
begin to clean it up. Don't underestimate your own influence. Use it,as we are frying to use ours.

wants mnsurance to be affordable.
SThe man was awarded
$L250,000, or about $89,000 a
year, forrthe remaining 14 years
of his life expectancy. The jury
awarded an extra $500,000 to
his wife for loss of "consortium"
-the company, affection and
services of her husband.
2A by-product of such awards

itna Life&Casualty,
151Farmington Avenue.
Hartford,
CT06156

has been a quantum leap in the
number of personal injury and
property damage suits filed. A
1977 study in Californja shows
such suitsincreasing atfive times
the rate ofpopulation growth,
3 Most awards are paid by insurance, and insurance companies spend millions more defend-

ing policyholders against lawsuits. The direct result is rising
premiums for automobile and
other liability coverages. The indirect result is higher prices for
goodsand services--prices which
are boosted to cover the skyrocketing insurance premiums of
manufacturers, doctors, hospi-

tals, and others who are targets
for windfall awards.
4For example, it would help
if juries were simply required to
take into account payments the
claimant has already received
for medical bills and lost wages.
Under the present system, thes
bills may be paid all over again.

LIFE&CASUALTY
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Thejurysmiled
when they made the award.
They didn'tknow it was coming
out of their own pockets.

-

They thought
they were giving
away the insurance
company's money.
So it wouldn't
hurt to be generous.
Because insurance
companies can afford
to pay big awards.
All they have to do is
collect higher
insurance premiums.
From you.
And excessive
awards eventually cost you money.
We don't object to paying
fair awards.That's our business.
But paying exaggerated awards
inflates costs.
And can affect your insurance
in other ways. Insurance
companies might be forced to
limit the kinds of coverage or
the number of policies they write.
Insurance, after all, is simply a
means of spreading risk. Insurance
companies collect premiums
from many people and compensate the few who have losses.

The price ot insurance must
reflect the rising cost of compensating those losses and the work
that goes into doing that.
And that includes the escalation
in jury awards.
That's why your premiums have
been going up.
No one likes higherprices.
But we're tellingit straight.
CRUM&FORSTER
INSURANCE COMPANIES
THE POUCY MAKERS.
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